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Abstract
This paper presents the results of a novel mathematical and experimental analysis
of two approaches to margining customer accounts, strategy-based and risk-based.
Building combinatorial models of hedging mechanisms of these approaches, we
show that the strategy-based approach is, at this point, the most appropriate one
for margining security portfolios in customer margin accounts, while the risk-based
approach can work efficiently for margining only index portfolios in customer mar-
gin accounts and inventory portfolios of brokers. We also show that the application
of the risk-based approach to security portfolios in customer margin accounts is
very risky and can result in the pyramid of debt in the bullish market and the
pyramid of loss in the bearish market. The results of this paper support the thesis
that the use of the risk-based approach to margining customer accounts with posi-
tions in stocks and stock options since April 2007 influenced and triggered the U.S.
stock market crash in October 2008. We also provide recommendations on ways
to set appropriate margin requirements to help avoid such failures in the future.
1 Introduction
“We still have a 1930s regulatory system in place. We’ve got to update our institutions,
our regulatory frameworks, . . . ”. . . the banking system has been “dealt a heavy blow,” the
result of “lax regulation, massive overleverage, huge systematic risks taken by unregulated
institutions, as well as regulated institutions.” – Barack Obama1
Calculating margin requirements for margin accounts2 is a critical intra-day and end-
of-day risk management operation for any brokerage firm, clearing house or securities
trader. In the margin accounts of investors, i.e., customers of brokers, margin payments
are based on established minimum margin requirements which are subject of margin
regulations. Margin rules exist for margining single positions, offsets3 like trading
strategies or larger groups of positions like portfolios comprising all positions with a
common underlying instrument,4 and entire accounts which are collections of portfolios.
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Deducting the minimum margin requirement for an account from its market value
we obtain its loan value, which is the maximum portion of the account’s market value
that the broker can lend. The amount that is actually lent to a customer by the broker
constitute the margin credit given for all customer’s margin accounts. The total margin
credit provided by all brokers in a market constitutes the market’s margin debt.
With adjustments in minimum margin requirements (or the maximum credit re-
quirements), margin regulators keep margin debt at a level consistent with the canons
of a healthy economy. High margin requirements can reduce investors’ activity, lead to
underpricing of securities, and cause economic slowdowns. Low margin requirements,
in turn, lead to overpricing of securities, high levels of speculation, cash deficits, market
crashes, and, again, economic slowdowns. The challenge is to find a proper approach
to portfolio margining, a “golden mean” that keeps the growth of margin debt within
tolerable limits. Such an approach is specified by the definition of offsets and margin
rates, i.e., margin requirements per unit of security and per unit of offset.
Current margining practice uses two approaches, strategy-based and risk-based. The
strategy-based approach uses offsets that imitate trading strategies while the risk-based
approach considers the entire portfolio to be an offset. The strategy-based approach
uses margin rates calculated without variations of the current market prices of the un-
derlying instruments. In contrast, the risk-based approach uses margin rates calculated
by artificial variations of the current market prices with the purpose to find a worst-
case scenario in their moves. The goal of this paper is a comparative analysis of the
approaches that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been done before.
1.1 State of the Art: Strategy
The strategy-based approach to margining customer accounts with equity derivatives
such as stock or index options, futures and warrants have been used in the brokerage
industry for more than four decades. By the end of the nineties, it was commonly
recognized that this approach yields excessively high margin requirements.
The main reason for the high margin requirements obtained by the strategy-based
approach is, as shown in Section 3, that the calculation of the minimum margin by
using offsets with more than two legs5 is an intractable combinatorial problem that is
not well understood. Despite the fact that margin regulations have a 75-year history
dating from Regulation T in the Securities Act of 1934, the literature on margin calcu-
lations is surprisingly small.6 We can point to only two books [Geelan and Rittereiser,
1998; Curley, 2008] and two papers [Fortune, 2000, 2003] devoted to margining practice,
two papers [Moore, 1966; Luckett, 1982] studying the influence of margin requirements
on investor’s equity ratio, and two papers [Rudd and Schroeder, 1982; Fiterman and
Timkovsky, 2001] devoted to margining algorithms. The vast majority of publications
on margining consists primarily of regulatory circulares and manuals. Margin calcu-
lations have never attracted the attention of mathematicians or computer scientists
because they have been traditionally considered a prerogative of brokerage accounting,
something that is enforced and interpreted by security market lawyers.
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Consequently, margin calculation systems, developed and used in the brokerage in-
dustry up to 2005, ignore highly effective and broadly applicable discrete optimization
methods, such as integer and dynamic programming. In particular, the reduction of
the margin-minimization-by-pairing problem to the minimum-cost network-flow prob-
lem [Rudd and Schroeder, 1982] was seemingly forgotten for more than 20 years.
As a result, existing margin calculation technology, faced with the combinatorial
complexity of the strategy-based approach, failed to take advantage of complex option
spreads. The vast majority of margin calculation systems used in the brokerage indus-
try, as our study shows, uses offsets with two legs only; and they are based on outdated
heuristics proposed by brokers in the mid seventies [Cox and Rubinsein, 1985; Geelan
and Rittereiser, 1998]. The most advanced margining systems recognize offsets with up
to four legs by using heuristics that cannot guarantee the minimum margin. But the
failure to use offsets with more that two legs, as we show in Section 5, can increase the
margin requirement from zero to several thousands of dollars.
One of the goals of this paper is to rehabilitate the strategy-based approach and to
show that it enables the calculation of much more appropriate margin requirements for
security portfolios in comparison with those calculated by the risk-based approach.
1.2 The Regulatory Breakthrough of 2005: Strategy
High margin requirements obtained by the strategy-based approach can also be partially
explained by the fact that margin rules prior to 2005 permitted the use of offsets with
only few legs. However, the more legs an offset has the more margin reduction it gives.
Thus, the reduction of minimum margin requirements can be achieved by designing
new offsets with larger number of legs.
Offsets with two, three and four legs, imitating options trading strategies, such as
calendar spreads, straddles, butterfly spreads, condor spreads, collars and box spreads
were known and permitted in margin regulations since the mid seventies. Offsets with
more than four legs, a very efficient means of achieving adequate margin reductions,
did not appear until 30 years later in 2005.
Specifically, in August 2003 the CBOE7 proposed new margin rules for offsets with
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 legs that were called “complex option spreads.”8 After two revi-
sions of this document,9 the SEC10 approved these rules11 and added them to NYSE12
Rule 431 in December 14, 2005. In August 2007, these rules were also recognized in
Canada.13
The regulatory move of 2005 was a very important step in the development of
the strategy-based approach because it demonstrated that four legs is not the final
step. Moreover, as shown in [Matsypura et al., 2007], 12 legs is also not the final step,
because there exists a method of designing offsets with any desired number of legs.
In particular, it was shown that there exist offsets with a maximum of 134 legs if the
number of different exercise prices of the options involved is at most four.
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1.3 The Pilot Program of 2005–2008: Risk
The risk-based approach14 was proposed in 1989 by the OCC15 to calculate net capital
requirements for brokers’ proprietary portfolios of listed options.16 It was implemented
in 1996 in TIMS17 and approved by the SEC18 to be effective as of September 1, 1997.
However, the approach was not used for margining customer accounts prior to 2005.19
Employing lower margin rates and larger offsets in contrast to the strategy-based
approach, the risk-based approach produces substantially lower initial margin require-
ments. In the examples provided by the CBOE, the requirements for naked options and
basic option spreads are at least two or three times lower.20 (72 times lower for a long
straddle!) After two NYSE proposals,21 the SEC approved the use of the risk-based
approach to margining customer accounts under a temporary pilot program.22
The pilot program can be divided into three phases: Phase I started on July 14, 2005
and permitted the use of the risk-based approach to margin accounts with only listed
BBI23 and ETF24 derivatives such as options, warrants, futures, and future options.
Phase II started on July 11, 2006 and included listed stock options and securities
futures.25 Phase III started on April 2, 2007 and included equities, equity options,
unlisted derivatives and NBI26 futures.27 The pilot program was to expire on July 31,
2007. However, on July 19, 2007 it was extended for one more year, and the risk-based
approach was finally approved to be used permanently on July 30, 2008.28
Monthly margin debt reports published by the NYSE provide clear evidence of
the influence of the pilot program on the stock market; see Fig. 1. During the initial
20-month period of the pilot program (July 2005 - April 2007), the margin debt had
increased by $82.22 billion compared to the $38.80 billion increase during the previous
20 months. Although the beginning of this period, between the starting points of
Phases I and II, looks ordinary, the ending of this period, between the starting points
of Phases II and III, is remarkable owing to the unusually high rate of increase in the
margin debt and the trading volume volatility of the S&P 500 index.
During the subsequent four-month period (April 2007 - July 2007), the period when
equities, equity options, unlisted derivatives and NBI futures joined the pilot program,
the margin debt increased by another $88.21 billion, i.e., at a rate at least five times
higher. Thus, since April 2, 2007, the margin debt increased at a rate of more than
$22.05 billion per month. Historical records show that a fast growth of margin debt
can be a sign of an approaching market crash. Such was the case in October 1929 and
October 1987. Examining the two most recent examples, consider the assessments of
the market crash of October 2000 in [Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 2008] (p. 87):
“As of February 2000, total margin debt stood at $265 billion. It had grown 45 percent
since the previous October and had more than tripled since the end of 1995. Relative to
GDP,29 margin debt was the highest it had been since 1929, and over three times as high
as it was in October 1987. It was an unmistakable sign of rampant speculation.”
Bringing these assertions more up-to-date, we observe that, as of July 2007, total
margin debt stood at $381 billion. It had grown 30 percent since the previous March
and had almost tripled since the end of 2002. Relative to GDP, margin debt was the
highest it had been since February 2000; see Fig. 2.
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Figure 1: The margin debt in billions of dollars, the margin debt relative to GDP, and the level
and trading volume of the S&P 500 index in the period from November 2003 through October 2008.
The curves are scaled to fit on one graph and drawn by smoothing the end-of-the-month data from
http://www.nyse.com/ and http://finance.yahoo.com/.
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that the market credit in the period from April through
July 2007 was excessive in the extreme: 27% increase in Margin Debt/GDP. Even
though the margin debt reached the level of $381.37 billion by the end of July 2007,
the pilot program had, nevertheless, been extended for an additional year. In September
2007, it was clear that the growth in margin debt had lessened because in August 2007
it fell to $331.37 billion as a result, in particular, of numerous margin calls received
by investors and associated forced sales from their undermargined accounts.30 By
July 2008, the time of the final approval of the risk-based approach, the margin debt
had plunged to $314.36 billion, signalling an approaching stock market downfall. In
September 2008 the margin debt had another plunge from $299.96 to $233.35 billion,
and the stock market downfall was evident as indicated by the level of S&P 500.
5
19991998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
2.70%
2.87%
October 2000 October 2008
February 2000
July 2007
Figure 2: Margin Debt/GDP in the period from the end of 1998 through the end of 2008. Data from
http://www.nyse.com/ and http://finance.yahoo.com/
“The task of the Board, as I see it, is to formulate regulations with two principal objec-
tives. One is to permit adequate access to credit facilities for security markets to perform
their basic economic functions. The other is to prevent the use of stock market credit from
becoming excessive. The latter helps to minimize the danger of pyramiding credit in a
rising market and also reduces the danger of forced sales of securities from undermargined
accounts in a falling market.” – William McC. Martin, Jr.31
In July 2007, it was clear that the market credit had been excessive during the preceding
three months: it had been growing at an unprecedented pace and relative to GDP had
reached its highest level since the market crash of October 2000. In July 2008, it
was clear that the stock market had been falling for the previous twelve months. Yet
the practice of using the risk-based approach, which evidently caused excessive market
credit, was continuing.
We argue in this paper that the stock market crash of October 2008 has a direct
link to the adoption of the risk-based approach for margining customer accounts in
the U.S. stock market. As we show in Section 5, this approach provided a substantial
margin reduction, especially for call portfolios and bear portfolios.
1.4 State of the Art: Risk
As we will see in Section 4.2, the main mathematical model of the risk-based approach
is asset pricing. The literature on this topic is overwhelming; see [Duffie, 2003]. The
main option pricing models are the Black-Sholes model [Black and Scholes, 1973] for
European-style options32 and the Brennan-Schwartz model [Brennan and Schwartz,
1977] for American-style options.33 Although the SEC permits the use of any asset
pricing algorithm or software approved by the DEA,34 there exists only one approved
asset pricing software system today: the pricing module of STANS35 developed by the
OCC. Thus, risk-based margining today is monopolized in the U.S. by the OCC.36
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1.5 Contributions and Plan of the Remainder of the Paper
The contributions of this paper are (1) an argument showing that the risk-based ap-
proach is being misused in application to security portfolios, (2) an argument showing
that the risk-based approach is appropriate to use in application to only index portfo-
lios, and (3) an explanation of why the risk-based approach is advantageous for playing
call or bear37 and could have influenced the quick growth of the margin debt in the
U.S. stock market in the period from July 2006 through July 2007.
To develop these contributions, we introduce a mathematical model of portfolio
margining in Section 2. Within this model the analysis of the strategy and risk-based
approaches is given in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 4.5, we show that the
risk-based approach being applied to security portfolios can cause a pyramid of debt
in a bull market and a pyramid of loss in a bear market. Computational experiments
with both approaches are presented in Section 5. The results of the computational
experiments are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes our findings.
2 A Model of Portfolio Margining
The existing practice of margin calculations uses the following four components that
must be specified in any approach to margining portfolios:
• Position Margining, i.e., the method of calculating the margin requirement for
an individual position, which is also called a naked position, in a margin account
regardless of the presence of other positions. Position margining can also be
considered as margining a portfolio that consists of only one position.
• Offset Margining, i.e., the method of calculating the margin requirement for a
group of offsetting positions, which are simply called offsets. Since the positions
offset each other, the margin requirement for an offset is lower than the total
position margin in the offset. Therefore, offsets are the means of margin reduc-
tions. Offsets can be considered as portfolios of restricted sizes whose margin
calculations are “manageable”, i.e., margin requirements for offsets can be easily
calculated by a simple formula or procedure.
• Portfolio Partitioning, i.e., the method of partitioning a portfolio into blocks
which are positions or offsets. Thus, if margin requirements for positions and
offsets are defined, then the margin for the entire portfolio can be calculated as
the total margin requirement of these blocks.
• Portfolio Classification, i.e., the method of defining portfolio types depending on
what security types are in a portfolio’s positions. Position margining and offset
margining are usually dependent on security types and portfolio types.
Definitions related to portfolio partitions and portfolio classifications are given in Sec-
tions 2.1 and 2.2.
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2.1 Portfolio Partitions
Let S be the set of financial securities traded on the market. A portfolio on S can be
formally defined as a triplet (P, i, q), where
• P is a nonempty position set, i.e., the set of positions, also called components, in
securities from S;
• i is the investment function which defines an injection of the set P into S, i.e.,
i(p) is the security in position p, and p 6= p′ implies i(p) 6= i(p′); and
• q is the quantity function on P , i.e., q(p) is the number of units of i(p).
The inequality constraint in the second bullet means that two or more positions in the
same security are not allowed in portfolios for margining purposes; if such positions
appear as a result of several buy transactions, they must be consolidated into one
position with a netted quantity before margining.
In what follows, it will be convenient to associate portfolios with their position sets
and trivial portfolios with positions. For the purposes of this paper, a margin account
is just a portfolio. Let |P | be the size of a portfolio P . The portfolio of size |S| is the
market portfolio. Portfolios of size one are trivial.
Let P1 and P2 be two portfolios on S with the investment functions i1 and i2 and
the quantity functions q1 and q2. We say that the two portfolios are similar if P1 = P2
and i1 = i2. Thus, similar portfolios differ in position quantities only.
If P1 and P2 are similar portfolios and there exists an integer n1 > 1 such that
n1q1(p) = q2(p) for all p ∈ P1, then we say that n1 is a divisor of P2 and write
n1P1 = P2. Portfolios without divisors are prime. A portfolio P has exactly one
similar prime portfolio; it is called a base of P and denoted by P˙ . Thus, P = nP˙ for
some positive integer n, which we call the multiplicity of P˙ ; the portfolio P thus is a
multiple of P˙ .
We say that P1 is a subportfolio of P2 or that P2 contains P1 if P1 ⊆ P2 and i1 is a
restriction of i2 to P1, i.e., i1(p) = i2(p), and q1(p) ≤ q2(p) for all p ∈ P1.
Let P1, . . . , Pk be mutually disjoint subportfolios of some portfolio P with quantity
functions q1, . . . , qk, respectively. Then we say that these subportfolios generate a
partition of P and write P = P1 + . . .+ Pk if
q(p) =
k∑
i=1
∑
p∈Pi
qi(p)
for any position p ∈ P . If n1, . . . , nk are multiplicities of P˙1, . . . , P˙k, respectively, then
the sum P = n1P˙1 + . . .+ nkP˙k is called a prime partition of P on ρ = {P˙1, . . . , P˙k}.
Let ρ be a collection of prime portfolios on S including all |S| trivial prime portfolios,
so that |S| ≤ k. Then it is clear that a prime partition of any portfolio P on ρ always
exists. If the maximum position quantity in the portfolio P is n then the number of all
possible prime partitions of P on ρ is at most (n+ 1)k.
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2.2 Portfolio Classification
Let I and S denote the sets of indices and securities in the market, respectively. We
distinguish these financial instruments because, unlike indices, securities (including
ETFs based on indices) are traded on the market, i.e., they have trading units. The
market itself can be defined as the union M = I + S.
Let u : S →M be the underlying function on S, i.e., u(s) is the underlying instru-
ment for the security s ∈ S, and s is a derivative from u(s). Let U denote the set of
underlying securities, i.e., U = {s ∈ S : ∃s′ : u(s′) = s}. Then the sum B = I + U is
the set of underlying instruments of M , which we call the base of the market M . Let
u−1(b) be the set of derivatives from the underlying instrument b ∈ B. Then the set
Sb =
{ {b}+ u−1(b) if b is a security or
u−1(b) if b is an index
is a security class associated with the underlying instrument b ∈ B. We say that P is
a class portfolio based on the underlying instrument b if all securities in P belong to
the class Sb. If not stated otherwise, the term “portfolio” refers to a class portfolio.
Margin regulations distinguish the following three types of underlying instruments:
1: a high-capitalization BBI and an ETF based on it,
2: a low-capitalization BBI and an ETF based on it,
3: an NBI and a margin eligible security.
The type of an underlying instrument b defines the type of a portfolio P based on b.
3 Strategy-Based Approach
The combinatorial essence of the strategy-based approach arises from the ability to
partition a margin account in many different ways in accordance with a large variety
of offsets given in the margin rule book. Each securities market follows its own margin
rule book, for example, NYSE Rule 431 in the U.S. or Regulation 100 in Canada. The
strategy-based offsets are of fixed size and imitate trading strategies.
In brokerage jargon, offsets of sizes 1, 2, 3 and 4 are singles, pairs, tripos and quads;
the positions of the offsets are legs. Offsets of sizes at least two are proper. Proper
offsets such as bull or bear spreads, straddles or option-security combinations are pairs,
butterfly spreads or collars are tripos, and iron butterfly spreads, condor spreads or box
spreads are quads; cf. [Cohen, 2005]. Complex offsets38 can have up to 12 legs.39
3.1 Position Margining: Strategy
The margin requirement for an individual position in the strategy-based approach is
a certain percentage of the current security market value contained in this position.
This percentage is called a margin rate. The higher the market price of the security,
the more reliable it is considered; therefore, a smaller margin rate is assigned to this
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security in strategy-based margin regulations. The margin rate is also dependent on
security type, rating, expiry date, the market where it is traded, whether the position is
long or short, and other factors. Margin rules for positions in derivatives are not simple
at times, and the related margin requirements can have nontrivial margin formulas.40
Fixed-income securities like bonds, debentures and notes have much lower margin
requirements than equity securities because they are much less volatile. Stocks are the
most volatile equity securities and have the most stringent margin requirements. For
example, U.S. initial and maintenance margin rates for stocks in long positions are 50%
and 25%, respectively.41 Note that the Regulation T initial rate of 50% has remained
unchanged since 1974, and it has never been lower than 40% since 1940. In Section 4.1,
we will see that the risk-based approach assigns both initial and maintenance margin
rates for stocks as low as 15%.
3.2 Hedging Mechanism of Strategy-Based Offsets
Trading strategies, called strategies for short, are special portfolios with known “exits”.
The positions of a strategy appear in a margin account as a result of simultaneous buy
and sell trades. Strategies are designed not only to maximize the profit in favorable
scenarios but also to provide the possibility to liquidate all or some of their positions
in unfavorable scenarios; see e.g. [Cohen, 2005].
Offsets in the strategy-based approach imitate strategies. A single exit is also
associated with an algorithm for liquidating (closing) all or some of the positions of the
offset with a minimum loss. In accordance with the strategy-based approach, margin
regulators choose the worst exit and calculate the maximum minimum loss, i.e., the
minimum loss in the worst case scenario. This loss constitutes the minimum regulatory
margin requirement for the offset.42
We can formally define an offset as a portfolio with the associated collection of
liquidation algorithms that we call a hedging mechanism for the offset. Each liquidation
algorithm is usually associated with a subset of positions in exercisable securities43
in the offset (such as options, futures, warrants, convertible bonds) and represents
a sequence of trades (buy and sell transactions) which must be triggered once all
exercisable securities in the subset are exercised.44 Thus, offsets in the strategy-based
approach are supported by hedging mechanisms for exiting from dangerous situations.
Since every liquidation algorithm is a sequence of trades, the hedging mechanism defines
necessary and sufficient cash flows and security flows that must be run to satisfy all
parties involved in the offset liquidation.
It is important to observe that the hedging mechanism for a prime offset O˙ generates
the hedging mechanisms for all its multiples because the hedging mechanism for mO˙ is
just the hedging mechanism for O˙ applied m times to the offset O. Margin regulations
therefore describe only prime offsets. Any margin rule represents actually a prime
offset and the margin requirement for it, and any margin rule book is a collection of
margin rules. In what follows, we will associate a rule book with a collection of prime
offsets ρ that includes all |S| trivial prime offsets and keep in mind that the margin
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requirements for the prime offsets are given. The more offsets there are in the rule
book, the more opportunities exist for margin reductions. It is important to emphasize
that offsets make margin reductions possible not at the expense of increasing the risk
but, in contrast, through hedging against the worst case scenario, using the hedging
mechanisms provided for that purpose.
3.3 Hedging Mechanism of a Call Spread
Let us consider, for example, the hedging mechanism of a call spread involving a short
position in a call option C45 and a long position in another call option D on the same
underlying security U , at the same expiry date, exercise price e and contract size s.
The mechanism consists of only one liquidation algorithm which must be triggered once
the holder of C exercises the option:
• the buy of s units of U by the holder of D from the writer46 of D at the price e;
• the sell of s units of U by the holder of D to the holder of C at the price e.
Thus, the holder of the spread is protected by this hedging mechanism against the
underlying security price fluctuations. The maximum loss here is the cost of the spread
paid at the time when the position in this spread was entered.
Each of these trades implies the cash flow of quantity se from a buyer to a seller and
the underlying security flow of quantity s from a seller to a buyer. It is also important
to notice that this pair of trades involves (apart from the brokers) the following three
parties:
• the writer of D;
• the holder of the call spread, i.e., the holder of D who is also the writer of C; and
• the holder of C.
Thus, the call spread holder can trigger the hedging mechanism in order to avoid a
loss larger than the spread cost in the case when the holder of C decides to exercise
the option. The call spread holder in this case plays the role of an intermediary (third
party) between the holder of C who buys s units of the underlying security at the
price e and the writer of D who sells them at the same price. The hedging mechanism,
therefore, determines who receives the money in the amount of se, who receives s units
of the underlying security and from where, when the call spread must be closed.
We have considered the hedging mechanism of the simplest offset. In general, the
hedging mechanism of an offset with many positions involves a series of trades (cf. [Co-
hen, 2005]), but the main point is that it makes clear the money distribution (money
side) and the underlying security distribution (security side) among the parties involved
in the related set of trades, when the offset must be closed. That is why the offsets in
the strategy-based approach are two-sided offsets.
In the above example we considered security options, i.e., options on a security,
such as an equity, ETF, bond, currency, or commodity. Exercising security options
triggers a cash flow and a security flow. Exercising index options, i.e., options on an
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index, triggers a cash flow only. For example, exercising an index call option brings to
the option holder the difference between the index price and the option exercise price.
Thus, the hedging mechanism of an index call spread is much simpler because it entails
only the movement of money.
3.4 Cross Margining: Strategy
If an offset is a class portfolio (see the definition in Section 2.2), i.e., all its positions
have the same underlying instrument, then we call it a class offset. The vast majority
of offsets created for margin calculations are actually class offsets. There also exist
cross offsets whose positions are based on different (crossing) underlying instruments,
which do not necessarily belong to the same securities market. This explains the term
cross margining when cross offsets are permitted. Cross offsets are usually permitted if
they are underlain by highly correlated market indices or ETFs based on these indices.
Therefore, cross offsets are cross-index products.
Cross offsets can be easily designed from class offsets by allowing some positions
to have different underlying instruments. Margin requirements for cross offsets are
usually more stringent and take into consideration the correlation between the crossing
underlying instruments. Although class offsets are often more advantageous than cross
offsets, there is no priority to class offsets in the strategy-based approach. If cross
offsets turn out to be more efficient than class offsets in margin reductions then they
are allowed to be used first. As we will see in Section 4.2, the situation is different in
the risk-based approach because it gives priority to class offsets.
3.5 Account Offsetting and Margining: Strategy
The essence of the strategy-based approach is to find a hedging mechanism for a margin
account by the consolidation of the hedging mechanisms of the offsets contained in the
account. Let A be a margin account, let ρ = {O˙1, . . . , O˙k} be a rule book, and let
A = x1O˙1 + . . .+ xkO˙k
be a prime partition of A on ρ; see Fig. 3 for an example. Since the hedging mechanisms
of the prime offsets O˙j generate the hedging mechanisms of the multiples xjO˙j , the
hedging mechanism of A is just a consolidation of the hedging mechanisms for the
multiples. Thus, the hedging mechanisms of the prime offsets O˙j must be applied xj
times to the positions of A that are covered by these offsets and, since the multiples
xjO˙j cover all position quantities in the account A, the entire account becomes hedged.
If mj is the margin requirement for the prime offset O˙j then,in accordance with the
strategy-based approach, the margin requirement for the margin account A is
m1x1 + . . .+mkxk
Thus, a margin requirement for A is associated with a prime partition of A, and every
prime partition of A gives a margin requirement for A. Hence, finding a minimum
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BEARISH POSITIONS BULLISH POSITIONS
condor put
straddle
butterfly call
butterfly call
long puts
short calls
short puts
long calls
Figure 3: An account A that consists of only one class portfolio with nine positions in options which
are marked by nine different colors. Each option contract is depicted by a ball. The account A thus
has total of fifteen option contracts. The figure shows the prime partition A = O˙1 + O˙2 + 2O˙3 + O˙4 on
NYSE Rule 431 that involves the prime offsets O˙1, O˙2, O˙3, and O˙4 which are a condor put spread, a
long straddle, a butterfly call spread, and a naked long position in one call option contract, respectively.
regulatory margin requirement for an account is finding its prime partition, i.e., multi-
plicities x1, . . . , xk, such that the latter sum achieves the minimum. We will refer to this
problem as the account margin minimization (AMM) problem. If the maximum offset
size in the rule book ρ is d then we will say that the AMM problem is of dimension d.
Consequently, the AMM problem of dimension two is the AMM problem by pairing.
Thus, finding the margin requirements for margin accounts in the strategy-based
approach means solving the AMM problem. Achieving the minimum is important for
both the brokers and the account owners because the knowledge of the regulatory min-
imum against the real margin requirement gives the exact estimate of the overcharge.
On the other hand, the minimum represents an adequate measure of risk.
3.6 Mixed Integer Program for Strategy-Based Margining
We show next that the AMM problem reduces to a mixed integer program (MIP). This
reduction will allow us to use standard optimization software for the calculation of
strategy-based margins in our computational experiments presented in Section 5.
Let a margin account have m positions i = 1, 2, . . . ,m with quantities qi and n prime
offsets j = 1, 2, . . . , n from ρ. Prime offset j can be represented by the column vector
oj whose ith component oij is the quantity of the ith components of prime offset j.
47
Note that oij = 0 if and only if position i is not involved in prime offset j. We assume
that m ≤ n and that prime offsets j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are trivial, i.e., they represent the
positions. Thus, the column vectors have ojj = 1 as the only nonzero elements.
Let mj be the margin requirement for prime offset j. Thus, mj is the margin
requirement for a single unit of the security in position j if 1 ≤ j ≤ m, or the margin
for prime offset j of size more than one if m+1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let xj denote the multiplicity
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of prime offset j. If we introduce the vectors48
m = ‖m1, . . . ,mn‖> q = ‖q1, . . . , qm‖> x = ‖x1, . . . , xn‖>
which we call a margin, quantity and variable vectors, respectively, and the offset matrix
O = ‖o1,o2, . . . ,on‖, then the AMM problem can be posed as finding an x which solves
min
{
m>x : Ox = q, x ≥ 0
}
(1)
where 0 is a zero column vector. Note that the size of O is m × n. In this MIP,
components of the variable vector x from m + 1 to n must be integers because they
define offset multiplicities of offsets with sizes more than one, while components from 1
to m can be real. They are integers if they are quantities of positions in such securities
like stocks (shares), options, warrants, but they can be real if they are, for example,
bond quantities. The quantity vector q is also integer but the margin vector m is real.
Without loss of generality, we assume that O = ‖I,P‖, where I and P are the
identity matrix, i.e., the matrix of trivial prime offsets, and the matrix of proper prime
offsets, i.e., the matrix of prime offsets of size at least two, respectively.
MIP (1) can be viewed as an extension of the transportation model introduced
in [Rudd and Schroeder, 1982] for the calculation of the minimum margin by pairing,
i.e., in the case where the matrix of proper prime offsets is a matrix of prime pairs.
3.7 Margining Practice: Strategy
Surprisingly, current margin calculation practice still uses heuristics designed in the
mid seventies based on brokers’ intuition and taste, even for margining by pairing. In
the general case, the most advanced heuristics take advantage of the result from [Rudd
and Schroeder, 1982] by using minimum-cost network-flow algorithms. There exist,
however, counterexamples showing that these heuristics can double regulatory mini-
mum margin requirements or even raise them from zero to catastrophic margin calls.
Millions of margin accounts maintained by prime brokers with the use of the strategy-
based approach therefore are substantially over-margined, just because there has been
no serious attempt to find efficient optimization algorithms.
Despite the fact that the AMM problem was posed (originally as a problem of
margining accounts with options only) more than thirty five years ago, it has not
been well studied and remains one of the most intractable problems in the brokerage
industry. Neither useful theoretical results nor solution techniques with reasonable
computing times are known. The only exception is the paper [Rudd and Schroeder,
1982] devoted to the AMM problem by pairing. It was shown that this case reduces to
the well-studied bipartite minimum-cost network-flow problem.
An analysis of the literature suggests that the AMM problem has never been con-
sidered in the MIP form, one of the more natural and popular ways of solving discrete
optimization problems. However, in Section 5, we show that MIP algorithms yield very
good results for the AMM problem.
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4 Risk-Based Approach
The risk-based approach has a much lighter optimization component (for cross margin-
ing only), but depends on artificial variations of current prices of underlying instruments
and the use of probabilistic models of asset pricing theory for pricing derivatives re-
lated to these variations. To decide what portfolios qualify for cross margining, the
method looks through historical data of the correlation of the instruments underlying
the portfolios.
As we will see, the combinatorial complexity of the strategy-based approach is
replaced in the risk-based approach by the complexity of asset pricing models related
to the difficulties in obtaining a high-level of statistical significance. In addition to
rejecting the entire rule book of fixed-size offsets based on trading strategies, it uses
much looser variable-size offsets based on grouping positions by underlying securities.
Details of the risk-based approach are as follows.
4.1 Position Margining: Risk
Similarly to the strategy-based approach, the risk-based approach uses the current
market price of a security for margin calculations, and in addition, it considers price
variations within certain ranges in an attempt to catch the worst-case price movement
for the entire portfolio. This technique is called portfolio choking.
According to the risk-based approach, in order to calculate the margin requirement
for each unit of a security s in a position whose underlying security u has the market
price c, it is necessary to consider in addition to c, ten more valuation points
c(1− ai) and c(1 + bi)
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and the constants a and b depend on the type of the underlying
instrument as follows:
• a = 0.016, b = 0.012 for type 1,
• a = 0.020, b = 0.020 for type 2,
• a = 0.030, b = 0.030 for type 3,
where the types are defined in Section 2.2. Thus, the lowest (highest) valuation points
appear to be 8%(6%), 10%(10%), 15%(15%) lower (higher) than the current market
price c for types 1, 2, and 3, respectively.49
It is important to observe that, in accordance with this rule, the risk-based margin
rate for stocks and margin eligible equities in customer margin accounts is only 15%,
the lowest margin rate since 1929. Before the stock market crash in October 1929 it was
10%. The current strategy-based margin rates are 50% (initial) and 25% (maintenance).
In our opinion, this significant margin reduction in margining individual stock po-
sitions together with the faulty hedging mechanism of risk-based offsets for stocks were
the main reasons for the stock market crash on October 2008, as noted in Section 1.3.
We consider the hedging mechanism of risk-based offsets in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
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Let cv, 1 ≤ v ≤ 11, be one of the eleven valuation points including c. If s = u,
i.e., s is the underlying security, then the difference ov = cv − c or c − cv shows the
outcome (gain if positive, and loss if negative) associated with point cv for long or
short positions in s, respectively, for each security unit.50
If s is a derivative, then the outcome associated with the valuation point cv should
be calculated in accordance with the mechanism of the derivative. In most cases, ov
is a function of cv, e (the exercise price of the derivative) and pv (the market price of
s estimated at the valuation point cv).
51 The estimated price pv must be calculated
using a qualified theoretical pricing model.
4.2 Account Offsetting and Margining: Risk
Unlike the strategy-based approach, the risk-based approach uses much more aggressive
offsets. Their margin requirements are simply net losses of the involved positions. To
calculate the margin requirement for an account A we need to perform the following
six steps, where Steps 2 through 5 should be repeated for each valuation point.
Step 1. Account Partition: Find the partition of A into the portfolios P1, . . . , Pk as-
sociated with the underlying instruments involved in A. Note that this operation
is free of any combinatorial element because it is equivalent to the enumeration
of all positions in the account.
Step 2. Finding Positions’ Theoretical Gains/Losses: Calculate the outcome opv for
each position p ∈ A.52
Step 3. Netting of Positions: Calculate the outcome nuv for each portfolio Pu,
u = 1, . . . , k, using the formula nuv =
∑
p∈Pu opv. Thus, nuv is the net outcome
of all positions in Pu for the evaluation point cv.
Step 4. Finding Gain and Loss Portfolios: At this point, each portfolio Pu is either
a loss portfolio with nuv < 0 or a gain portfolio with nuv > 0 or a null portfolio
with nuv = 0. In what follows, the notation L1v, . . . , Lmv and G1v, . . . , Gnv will
stand for the loss and gain portfolios, respectively. Their lower case counterparts,
i.e., l1v, . . . , lmv and g1v, . . . , gnv will stand for their losses and gains.
Step 5. Cross Margining: Find the guarantee-guarantor deficit dv for the valuation
point cv (see Section 4.3) and assign it as the margin requirement for cv. Note
that, if cross margining was not allowed, the guarantee-guarantor deficit would
be the total loss through all loss portfolios, i.e., dv = l1v + . . .+ lmv for each v =
1, . . . , 11.
Step 6. Account Margining: Assign the margin requirement for the account A to
be max{d0, d1, . . . , d11} with
d0 =
l∑
i=1
max{0.375, pi} · qiri + 0.375 ·
k∑
i=l+1
qiri
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where 1, . . . , l and l + 1, . . . , k are, respectively, long and short positions in A in
derivatives, and where pi, qi and ri are the position i unit price (per underlying
unit), quantity and derivative contract size, respectively.
4.3 Cross Margining: Risk
As is evident from Step 3 of the above algorithm, the risk-based approach allows us to
fully offset position losses by gains of another position inside each portfolio. In addition,
it allows us to offset, to a certain extent, losses of index portfolios of type i by gains
of index portfolios of type j if the pair (i, j) is either (1, 1), (2, 2) or (3, 3) (see the
definition of types in Section 2.2). Since these offsets connect different security classes
based on different indices, this technique is called cross margining.
It is important to note that cross margining offsets between portfolios are permitted
only if the OCC determines that the crossing indices associated with types 1, 2 and 3
are sufficiently correlated.53 Furthermore, the offset of an index by an ETF based on
it is permitted only if the ETF holds securities in the same proportion as the index.54
• 90% of the gain of a type 1 can offset the loss of type 1,
• 75% of the gain of a type 2 can offset the loss of type 2,
• 90% of the gain of a type 3 can offset the loss of type 3,
where the types are defined in Section 2.2. These percentages follow the haircut rule55
that must be applied before netting. Thus, prior to solving the guarantee-guarantor
deficit problem, one needs to reduce the gains gj by 10% for all gain portfolios Gj of
type 1 or 3, and by 25% for all gain portfolios Gj of type 2. We consider at this point
that the haircut has been applied.56
The problem of the distribution of gains to cover losses is not trivial. We now show
that a solution can be found by formulating it as a linear program. Let R denote the
guarantee-guarantor relation between the loss portfolios and the gain portfolios of the
same type defined by the OCC. Specifically, let 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then
(i, j) ∈ R if and only if the loss portfolio Li (guarantee)
can be offset by the gain portfolio Gj (guarantor)
Let xij denote the portion of the loss li in the loss portfolio Li that is assigned to be
offset by the gain portfolio Gj . Then the guarantee-guarantor deficit is
d =
m∑
i=1
li − n∑
j=1
xij
 = m∑
i=1
li −
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xij
Since the gain portfolio Gj can offset at most the gj loss of the loss portfolios,
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ gj (2)
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for all j such that (i, j) ∈ R; and, since the loss portfolio Li needs at most li to be
offset by the gain portfolios,
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ li (3)
for all i such that (i, j) ∈ R. If we are interested in reducing the guarantee-guarantor
deficit as much as possible, we need to solve the linear program that maximizes
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xij
with nonnegative variables xij under Conditions 2 and 3.
With the exception of the aggressive offsetting57 at Step 3 of the algorithm described
in Section 4.2, nothing contradicts the strategy-based approach. Portfolio choking,
however, has never been used in the strategy-based approach – although it could be.
Without portfolio choking, the risk-based approach is just a simplified case of the
strategy-based approach with substantially lower margin requirements for singles and
offsets. Further, for each class portfolio, the risk-based approach squeezes the entire
rule book of the strategy-based offsets into only one offset, which is the class portfolio
itself; see Fig. 4 for an example. If Step 3 were replaced by the procedure for creating
strategy-based offsets, the risk-based approach would turn into a hybrid approach. It
would have been natural to use this approach in the pilot program for a “cushioned”
transition.
BEARISH POSITIONS BULLISH POSITIONS
offset
long puts
short calls
short puts
long calls
Figure 4: The account from Fig. 3. It has only one risk-based offset which is the union of all four
strategy-based offsets shown in Fig. 3.
4.4 Hedging Mechanism of Risk-Based Offsets
As can be seen from the algorithm in Section 4.2, a risk-based offset is the entire port-
folio. Its hedging mechanism is just netting position losses and gains. It is important
to observe that, if the underlying instrument of the portfolio is a security, the netting
does not show security movements in the case when the portfolio must be liquidated.
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The risk-based approach, however, works well for index portfolios where exercises
of index options do not trigger any security movements.58 To confirm this fact we can
observe that the margin debt growth was quite moderate in the period between Phases I
and II when only portfolios with index products were involved in the pilot program, see
Fig. 1. However, once portfolios with security options and futures joined the program,
the debt started growing very fast. The following example shows a situation which, if
occurs, can cause such a fast growth of debt.
Consider a portfolio P with the following three positions: a long position in a call
option C, a short position in a call option C0 and a short position in a call option C1.
Thus, P is a call tripo. In what follows, it will be convenient to denote a long (short)
position in an option C as +C (−C), respectively, and a portfolio as a formal sum of
positions. Also, it will be natural to omit the + symbol, as accepted in formal sums.
Thus,
P = C − C0 − C1
All three options are on the same underlying stock and have the same expiry date and
contract size of 100 shares. Suppose that the expiry date is distant enough, so that
the options’ current prices are much smaller than the current price u of the underlying
stock, and therefore can be disregarded in the calculation of gains and losses. Suppose
further that at this point in time the options C, C0, and C1 are in the money and their
exercise prices have the following relationship with u:
u− u/2, u− u/4 and u− u/4,
respectively. Thus, the holder of P experiences gain in the amount of
50u = 100(u− u+ u/2)
on C and loss in the amount of
50u = 100(u− u+ u/4) + 100(u− u+ u/4)
on C0 and C1. Following the risk-based approach we should net the losses and the gain
and conclude that the margin requirement for P is zero.
Suppose now that the holders of C0 and C1 decide to exercise the options and
the holder of P decides to liquidate the portfolio exercising C. Upon exercising these
options, the holder of P has zero cash balance, because 50u−25u−25u = 0, 100 shares
of the stock from exercising the option C and the obligation to deliver 100 + 100 shares
to the holders of options C0 and C1. Thus, the holder of P is 100 shares short, and
these shares must be purchased to liquidate the portfolio. Since the risk-based approach
allows us to do this on 85% credit (the margin requirement is just 15%), the portfolio
liquidation requires borrowing 85u.
Thus, risk-based offsets do not provide a real hedge and encourage borrowing money
if P must be liquidated. Note that the strategy-based approach provides a complete
hedge for this portfolio, as it catches the spread C−C0 or C−C1 and requires a proper
margin charge for the naked short position −C1 or −C0, respectively.
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4.5 Pyramid of Debt
Now we show that the call tripos considered in the previous section can be used as
blocks for building a pyramid where each block would require borrowing money if all
options of pyramid’s bottom were exercised.
Suppose that the holder of the call option C0 is short in two call options C00 and
C01, and the holder of the call option C1 is short in two call options C10 and C11. Each
of these four options has the exercise price u − u/8. Thus, these holders are actually
the holders of the portfolios
P0 = C0 − C00 − C01 and P1 = C1 − C10 − C11
Each of the portfolio holders experiences a gain in the amount of
25u = 100(u− u+ u/4)
on the long position and a loss in the amount of
25u = 100(u− u+ u/8) + 100(u− u+ u/8)
on the short positions. Again, each of the portfolio holders is in the same situation
as the portfolio P holder and must purchase 100 shares of the stock to liquidate the
portfolio. Together they should borrow 2 · 85u.
The short options C00, C01, C10, C11 in their turn can be long options in the next
layer of portfolios P00, P01, P10, P11, in which options in short positions have exercise
price u− u/16; see Fig. 5.
C
C0
C00
C000 C001
C01
C010 C011
C1
C10
C100 C101
C11
C110 C111
P
P0 P1
P00 P01 P10P11
20 · 85u
21 · 85u
22 · 85u
Figure 5: pyramid of debt with three layers and total credit requirement (23 − 1) · 85u = 595u. The
arrows point to layers k = 1, 2, 3 with credit requirements 2k−1 · 85u.
Continuing by induction we can conclude that layer k contains 2k blocks, whose
options in short positions have exercise price u − u/(2k+1) and require the amount
2k−1 · 85u for closing these positions. The blocks thus build a pyramid with the total
debt (
20 + 21 + . . .+ 2k−1
)
· 85u =
(
2k − 1
)
· 85u
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If layer k is the base of the pyramid then exercising all 2k options in layer k requires
borrowing not only the amount 2k−1 · 85u to close short positions in these options, but
an additional amount(
2k − 1
)
· 85u− 2k−1 · 85u =
(
2k−1 − 1
)
· 85u
to close all of the other short positions of this pyramid. Thus, the borrowed amount is
almost doubled. Note that the underlying security moves from the top to the bottom
of the pyramid. Also note that the pyramid “works” only in the bull market when the
market price of the underlying security exceeds the exercise price of the call options
at the bottom of the pyramid; otherwise the holders of these options would not be
interested in exercising them.
We should emphasize that our example involves only the simplest blocks requiring
credit of 85u. In practice, the blocks could be more credit demanding. For example,
the quad with a long position in a call option with exercise price u − u/2 and three
short positions in call options with the same exercise price u− u/6 has zero risk-based
margin but requires the credit 170u to be liquidated. The base of the exponential growth
associated with the pyramid of debt built from these blocks then becomes three.
4.6 Pyramid of Loss
Replacing call options with put options everywhere in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 and keeping
the same exercise prices, we can construct blocks that are put tripos with zero risk-
based margin requirement and build a similar pyramid. In comparison with a call tripo,
a put tripo works in the opposite way. Suppose now that the market is bear. When the
price of the underlying security drops below the exercise price of the two put options in
the short positions in the tripo, its holder will experience a loss due to the obligation
to buy 200 units of the underlying security at the price higher than the current market
price. Since the holder is long in a single put option, a half of the loss can be eliminated
by exercising this option. However, after exercising this option, the holder of the put
tripo will be left with 100 units of the underlying security. Thus, the original loss is
not completely hedged.
The pyramid built from put tripos is a pyramid of loss because every block in it
brings loss. Obviously, the pyramid of loss does not work in the bull market. However,
it may be triggered as soon as the market becomes bearish. Once triggered, the pyramid
will continue to pull the market down due to numerous forced sales similar to those
that happened in July-August of 2007.
5 Computational Experiments
The strategy-based approach cannot compete with the risk-based approach in the speed
of computations because the latter is free of any combinatorial quantities. Nor does it
give an advantage in initial margin requirements, which are substantially higher than
those obtained by the risk-based approach; see Sections 1.3 and 4.1. But an answer to
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the question of whether the strategy-based approach always yields higher maintenance
margin requirements in comparison with the risk-based approach is not obvious.
The results of our experiments show indeed the opposite. To demonstrate this, we
compare the behavior of the portfolio maintenance margin requirement as a function
of the portfolio size that is calculated by both the strategy-based approach and the
risk-based approach in different scenarios. As before, we follow NYSE Rule 431.
Another goal of our experiments is to contrast different strategy-based algorithms
and clarify to what extent offsets with numbers of legs more than two can reduce main-
tenance margin requirements and increase computing time in comparison with two-leg
offsets. Note that the strategy-based approach accommodates many margining algo-
rithms, while the risk-based approach has only one hard-coded margining algorithm.
5.1 Design of the Experiments
As we discussed in Section 3, the strategy-based approach uses offsets of fixed sizes.
We say that a strategy-based algorithm is of dimension d if it solves the PMM problem
of dimension d, i.e., it takes into consideration all regulatory offsets of sizes 1, 2, . . . , d.
We consider dimensions two and four only.59 Strategy-based algorithms of dimensions
two and four were CPLEX algorithms60 solving MIP (1) from Section 3.6, where only
two-leg offsets and two-, three- or four-leg offsets were used, respectively.
The main idea of portfolio variation is to first build a maximal portfolio and then
randomly remove positions to provide a monotonic reduction of its size. The margin
requirement was computed for each generated portfolio by using the strategy-based
algorithms of dimensions two and four, and the risk-based algorithm. The portfolios
were generated by performing the following steps:
Step 1. A group of 16 call options and a group of 16 put options were selected61
such that exactly 8 options inside each group were in the money; see the table
on Fig. 6, where each row presents a call option and a put option with the same
exercise price.
Step 2. The maximal portfolio with 32 positions was built by creating 8 long positions
in randomly chosen 8 call options and 8 short positions in the remaining 8 call
options; the other 16 positions in put options were created in the same way. This
step was repeated 10 times and resulted in 10 unique maximal portfolios. The
next steps were repeated for each maximal portfolio.
Step 3. The number of option contracts in each position was randomly generated in
the range from 1 to 10. This step was repeated 50 times.
Step 4. A randomly selected position from one side (bearish or bullish) was removed
to get a portfolio of the smaller size.
Step 5. The number of option contracts in each remaining position was randomly
generated in the range from 1 to 10. This step was repeated 50 times.
Step 6. Steps 4-5 were repeated 29 times to get a total of 30 sets of 50 randomly
generated portfolios with sizes monotonically decreasing from 32 to 3. The side
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# ex price call price put price
1 45 39.70 0.45
2 50 35.50 0.67
3 55 31.90 1.00
4 60 25.30 1.45
5 65 21.50 1.90
6 70 17.30 2.70
7 75 13.50 3.90
8 80 10.10 5.34
9 85 7.10 7.38
10 90 4.63 10.00
11 95 2.85 14.83
12 100 1.75 17.02
13 105 0.95 21.50
14 110 0.50 26.03
15 115 0.20 28.40
16 120 0.15 32.90
Figure 6: Selected Options
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Figure 7: Balanced Portfolios
from which a position was to be removed in Step 4 was alternated to maintain a
balance between the number of bearish and bullish positions.
Step 7. Steps 3-6 were repeated 25 times alternating the starting side in Step 4. Each
time the random number generator was restarted to avoid repeated patterns.
Step 8. The margin requirements were averaged for portfolios of the same size. Hence,
we calculated 30 averaged margin requirements for each algorithm.
Steps 1 through 8 create a symmetric scenario because position quantities chosen at
Steps 3 and 5 are distributed uniformly between 1 and 10. The symmetric scenario
generates balanced portfolios where the numbers of call and put options, in-the-money
and out-of-the-money options, long and short positions are approximately the same.
Thus, to obtain each point in the graph, we computed and averaged margin require-
ments for 12,500 portfolios, with the total of 12,500 ·30 = 375,000 unique and randomly
generated balanced portfolios.
We also performed this experiment in six asymmetric scenarios to model unbalanced
portfolios with different kinds of asymmetry. We performed the same steps as in the
above algorithm except for Steps 3 and 5, where the quantities of options in the positions
were ranging according to the following three scenarios, where quantities A and B were
random integers in the intervals [7, 10] and [1, 4], respectively:
Long Portfolio : A/B option contracts for each long/short position,
Call Portfolio : A/B option contracts for each position in call/put options,
Bull Portfolio : A/B option contracts for each bullish/bearish position.
The other three asymmetric scenarios, Short Portfolio, Put Portfolio, Bear Portfolio,
respectively, were obtained by transposing A and B in the above three definitions.62
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Figure 8: Long Portfolios
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Figure 11: Put Portfolios
6 Results of the Experiment
The results of the experiment is presented in Figs. 7 through 13, where margin require-
ments are given in thousands of dollars for portfolio sizes 3, 4, 5, . . . , 31, 32. The notation
S2, S4, R stands for margin requirements obtained by the strategy-based algorithms of
dimensions two, four, and the risk-based algorithm, respectively.
Our main conclusion is that the strategy-based approach does not always yield a
higher margin requirement than the risk-based approach. Comparing the curves S4 and
R, we can conclude that the strategy-based approach yields lower margin requirements
than the risk-based approach for balanced (Fig. 7), long (Fig. 8) and put (Fig. 11)
portfolios of sizes more than 21, 15 and 8, respectively; and they are substantially
lower for portfolio sizes closer to 32.
In the other four scenarios, i.e., for short (Fig. 9), call (Fig. 10), bull (Fig. 12) and
bear (Fig. 13) portfolios, the risk-based approach is always more advantageous for all
portfolio sizes. It is especially advantageous for investors playing call or bear since the
related curves R are almost flat for call (Fig. 10) and bear (Fig. 13) portfolios.
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Figure 13: Bear Portfolios
With regard to the strategy-based approach, we can conclude that using tripos and
quads along with pairs yields a substantial margin reduction in comparison with using
only pairs; it is especially noticeable for balanced (Fig. 7), long (Fig. 8), short (Fig. 9),
call (Fig. 10) and put (Fig. 11) portfolios.
Except for scenarios with short (Fig. 9), bull (Fig. 12) and bear (Fig. 13) portfolios,
the trend of the strategy-based requirement is to be smaller for larger portfolios. Only
long portfolios (Fig. 8) reveal the same but weaker trend for the risk-based approach.
Thus, all margin requirements are decreasing with the growth of long portfolio size.
It is interesting to notice that the strategy-based approach remains almost insen-
sitive to switching the asymmetry type from call (Fig. 10) to put (Fig. 11) portfolios,
while the risk-based approach changes almost flat margin requirement curve into lin-
early increasing. Thus, the risk-based approach signals about risk associated with put
options but remains neutral to call options. Switching the asymmetry type from bull
(Fig. 12) to bear (Fig. 13) portfolios reveals the same behavior of the strategy-based ap-
proach but an opposite behavior of the risk-based approach. This phenomenon can be
explained only by the portfolio choking technique introduced in the risk-based approach
but not used in the strategy-based approach.
Obtaining significant margin reduction owing to offsets with three and four legs
in the strategy-based approach is computationally time consuming. CPU time for
portfolios of sizes between 3 and 20 (our study shows that the average size of customers’
margin portfolios in the U.S. is smaller than 12) is approximately 0.25 sec. If we
multiply this time by a million (this is a good estimate of customers’ margin accounts
under the custody of a large prime brokerage firm), then we get slightly more than 69
hours of CPU time. Note that this does not include data retrieval time.
Hence, in order to use the CPLEX optimization package, a large brokerage firm on
NYSE will require a very significant amount of computational resources because there
are only 17.5 hours available to produce margin account status reports by the morning
(9:30am) of the next business day, from the end (4pm) of the previous business day.
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6.1 Margining Component in the October 2008 Stock Market Crash
As shown in Section 4.1, the risk-based approach requires significantly lower initial
margin than the strategy-based approach. Hence, the start of Phase III of the pilot
program, when equities, equity options, unlisted derivatives and NBI futures became
eligible for risk-based margining, was widely anticipated by investors. Note that Phase
III was approved by the SEC in December 2006 to be effective on April 2, 2007. With
the start of this phase, investors received an additional incentive to enter the stock
market due to significantly lower initial margin requirement offered by the risk-based
approach. Consequently, during April-June 2007 numerous investors entered the mar-
ket stimulating demand for stocks and their derivatives and driving the market up.
Growing market, in turn, made the entrance even more attractive. During this period
margin debt jumped more than $82.22 billion; see Fig. 1.
At the same time the housing market started to see an increasing number of defaults
on mortgage loans. As a result, by July 2007 hedge-funds that invested in subprime
mortgages ran into trouble and were “forced to do a lot of selling.”63 Due to the large
scale of forced sales and a variety of other reasons the market became bearish.
Investors, who entered the market in April-June 2007 attracted by low initial margin
requirements of the risk-based approach, were faced with large margin calls in August-
September 2007. In order to fulfil their obligations they were forced to sell equity, which
drove the market down even more. Thus, the risk-based approach effectively played a
role of a trap with an easy entrance and a hard exit.
Investors, who observed that the market became bearish in August 2007, were given
a big incentive to enter bearish positions with low initial and almost zero maintenance
margin requirements thanks to the risk-based approach (Fig. 13). This drove the market
even further down leading to a subsequent market crash in October 2008.
7 Concluding Remarks
The strategy-based approach is, at this point, the most appropriate one for margining
security portfolios in customer margin accounts because it provides an exit strategy.
Our computational experiments show that over-margining can be eliminated by the use
of offsets of higher sizes and related strategy-based algorithms of higher dimensions.
In contrast, the risk-based approach does not provide any exit strategy for security
portfolios. In addition, it can be misleading with respect to the level of risk exposure
of the account as shown in Section 4.4. Hence it should not be used for margining
security portfolios in customer margin accounts.
However, the risk-based approach can work efficiently for margining index port-
folios in customer margin accounts and inventory portfolios of brokers, because the
liquidations of such portfolios do not involve any security movements. It is possible in
the former case because the underlying instrument is an index, which does not have
trading units, and in the latter case because the security movements are needed only
inside the inventory of a single broker. The application of the risk-based approach to
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security portfolios in customer margin accounts is in fact very risky and can result in
the pyramid of debt in the bullish market and the pyramid of loss in the bearish market.
We suggest that Phases II and III of the pilot program of using the risk-based approach
for margining security portfolios in customer margin accounts were major contributors
to the growth of margin debt in the period from December 2006 through July 2007 and
the subsequent stock market crash in October 2008.
We also have shown that the margin minimization problem with complex offsets
can be efficiently solved by optimization packages such as CPLEX. In our opinion, the
strategy-based approach was unjustly discredited by the belief that the combinatorial
problem stemming from the use of complex offsets could not be efficiently solved with
the help of standard optimization packages. Naturally, the development of special
optimization algorithms that can take into consideration particularities of the margining
can be expected to bring much better results.
Our general observation concerns margin rules for naked positions in underlying
securities. In both the strategy and risk-based approaches, the rules are based on
assigning a margin rate, i.e., a fixed percentage of the current security market value.
This percentage usually depends on the security type (in all rules known today), market
price bands (Canadian rule), and expiry date (bonds, debentures, and notes).
For example, in accordance with NYSE Rule 431, the margin rate for a naked long
stock position is 50%/25% (initial/maintenance) in the strategy-based approach and
15% in the risk-based approach; see Sections 4.1 and 3.1.
The main question regarding margin rates is how they are assigned. This question
is valid for any approach to portfolio margining because it is always possible to have a
trivial portfolio with only one security position. Why choose rates of 50%, 20%, 15% or,
say, 100% as was done in 1946? This fundamental issue must be addressed in further
research on margining. To the best of our knowledge, a model, method, or justifiable
technique for assigning securities margin rates does not exist today.64 So far, this issue
has been a prerogative of margin regulators, their intuition and experience. Margin
rates are being assigned now by “gut feeling”, the same way that option prices were
assigned before the appearance of the Black-Scholes formula.
The practice of margin calculations has a long history. However, the science and
art of margin calculations has only just begun to evolve. We hope that this paper will
attract the attention of margin regulators and academic researchers who are involved
in studying efficient exits from the current economic crisis.
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Notes
1From “Obama, Brown call for global changes, say financial regulations need to be revamped” by
Roger Runnigen and Robert Hutton, Bloomberg News, p. 4A · MARCH 4, 2009 · USA TODAY.
2Entering a security market an investor opens whether a cash account, where the market value of
purchased securities must be paid in full and short sales are not permitted, or a margin account, where
only a certain portion, i.e., a margin, of the market value of purchased securities can be paid and short
sales are permitted. The portion of the market value, complimentary to a margin, is a loan value that
is lent to the investor by the broker. Short sales mean that the broker lends to the investor the sold
securities. Purchases and short sales create long and short positions in a margin account.
3An offset is a group of positions where the risk associated with certain positions is hedged (offset)
by the other positions in the group.
4If D is a derivative from a security or index U , then U is the underlying instrument for D.
5This brokerage term stands for a number of positions in an offset.
6This remark does not refer to the literature devoted to studying the relationship between margin
requirements and market volatility. A survey of this literature can be found in [Kupiec, 1998].
7Chicago Board Options Exchange.
8CBOE Regulatory Circular RG03-066, August 13, 2003.
9CBOE Regulatory Circulares RG04-90, August 16, 2004, and RG05-37, April 6, 2005.
10The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
11SEC Release 34-52738, December 14, 2005.
12New York Stock Exchange.
13IDA Bulletin 3654, August 13, 2007.
14The concept also appears in margin regulations and business-related literature under the names
“portfolio margining approach” and “risk-based portfolio margining approach”. (In what follows, we
omit the adjective “margining” for compactness.) The argument standing behind the term “portfolio”
is based on the misrepresentation of the strategy-based approach as a treatment of a margin account
by considering individual positions only, while the “portfolio approach” treats a margin account as a
whole. The strategy-based approach also treats a margin account as a whole; although it does so in a
different way, it is still a portfolio approach. So we consider the term “risk-based approach” to be most
appropriate. For the same reason, we do not think that the term “rule-based approach,” frequently
used on the Internet as synonymous with strategy-based approach, is suitable because the risk-based
approach is also based on certain rules, such as Rule 15c3-1a or rules from Regulation T.
15The Options Clearing Corporation.
16SEC Release 34-27394, October 26, 1989.
17Theoretical Intermarket Margining System.
18SEC Releases 34-38248, February 6, 1997, see also [GAO/GGD-98-153, 1998]
19The SEC published the related NYSE proposal for public comments in SEC Releases 34-46576,
October 1, 2002 and 34-50885, December 20, 2004, before approving the approach in July 2005.
20www.cboe.com/margin, CBOE Rules 12.4, 9.15(c), 13.5 and 15.8A.
21SEC Releases 34-46576, October 1, 2002, and 34-50885, December 20, 2004.
22SEC Release 34-52031, July 14, 2005.
23Broad Based Index.
24Exchange Traded Fund.
25SEC Release 34-54125, July 11, 2006.
26Narrow Based Index.
27However, it was approved on December 12, 2006, SEC Release 34-54918.
28Exchange Act Release No. 58251, July 30, 2008, 73 FR 45506, August 5, 2008.
29Growth Domestic Product.
30See, for example, The Wall Street Journal, July-August 2007, for numerous reports on margin calls
and associated forced sales.
31From http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/martin55 0314.pdf, the speech
of William McC. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from
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April 2, 1951, through January 31, 1970, at the hearing on the study of the stock market before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Monday, March 14, 1955.
32European-style options can be exercised during a short period of time, usually one day, prior to
the expiry date.
33American-style options can be exercised at any time prior to the expiry date.
34Designated Examining Authority, Federal Register, Vol 73, no. 29, February 12, 2008.
35Recently the OCC replaced TIMS (Theoretical Intermarket Margining System) with STANS (The
System for Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulations), which was approved by SEC Release
34-53322, February 15, 2006, on the basis “that the amount of margin it will collect under STANS will
be significantly less than the amount of margin it currently collects under TIMS” and that “STANS
identifies a more realistic correlative relationship among underlying assets than TIMS.”
36SEC Release No. 34-57270, February 5, 2008. Also, see footnotes in Section 1.3.
37The brokerage term “to play bull, bear, long, short, call or put” means to have a margin account
whose positions are primarily bull, bear, long, short, positions in call or put options, respectively.
38SEC Release 34-52738, December 14, 2005.
39We should mention that it is possible to design offsets-centipedes with as many legs as desired. A
method in [Matsypura et al., 2007] generates centipedes with up to 134 legs.
40See NYSE Rule 431 for U.S., Regulation 100 for Canada, web sites of particular securities markets.
41Examples of margin rates in different countries can be found in [Roll, 1989].
42The worst case scenarios for the offset holder and the offset holder’s broker can be different. That
is one of the reasons why margin rules for brokers and their customers are usually not the same.
43Exercisable securities, such as options, futures, warrants, convertible bonds, can be exercised, i.e.,
converted under certain conditions into the underlying security.
44Note that the exercises are not to be performed during margin calculations, they are virtual only,
as in a simulation of reality.
45Here and in the rest of the examples we consider American-style options.
46An option writer is an investor who sells an option short and therefore has a short position in this
option in his/her margin account.
47Component quantities of prime offsets are integers, unlike the quantities of convertible securities
with non-integer conversion ratios.
48In what follows, A> denotes the transpose of matrix A. Thus, the transpose of a row vector is a
column vector and vice versa.
49These percentages follow Rule 15c3-1a, section (b)(1)(i)(B).
50These gains and losses are called “theoretical gains and losses” in SEC Release 34-53577.
51For example, if the security s is an option then, after calculating its in-the-money amount, iv =
max{cv − e, 0} if s is a call option or max{e− cv, 0} if s is a put option, its outcome in long positions
and short positions can be calculated as iv and pv − iv, respectively, multiplied by the option contract
size for each option.
52Note that since we add the position index p to ov to distinguish the outcomes from different
positions, the same index must be added to the parameters cv, e and pv in Section 4.1.
53The recent OCC’s methodology implemented in STANS even disregards portfolio types associated
with product groups; see SEC Release 34-53322, February 15, 2006.
54SEC Release 34-53577, March 30, 2006.
55The haircuts are used as cushions against market falls; see SEC Rule 15c3-1a (b)(1)(v)(B).
56In this section we remove the subscript v from the notation related to gains and losses bearing in
mind that the guarantee-guarantor deficit must be found for each of the eleven valuation points cv.
57Note that netting is the most radical way of offsetting because it brings the maximum advantage
to covering losses. On the other hand, netting “cares” about money movement only. As we show in
Sections 4.4 and 4.5, netting is very risky for security portfolios.
58Upon the exercise of an index call or put option, its holder receives, respectively, max{u− e, 0} or
max{e− u, 0}, where u is the underlying index price and e is the option exercise price.
59Note that an algorithm of dimension one just calculates the total positions’ margin. Offsets of sizes
more than four were not permitted up to December 2005 and are currently not being used in margining
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practice. The popularity of the risk-based approach, which appeared in the U.S. market in July 2005,
stalled further developments of strategy-based margining systems.
60We used ILOG CPLEX 12.1 on Dell Precision T7400 with two 3.5 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon
CPUs, 32 GB RAM running Windows XP 64-bit.
61These 32 options were on the IBM stock at the market price of $84.92 and expired on April 17, 2009.
The data was taken as of the end of the day of January 16, 2009, from http://finance.yahoo.com/.
For pricing options we used interest rate 0.3% and historical volatility 15% (since 2000). Note that we
could have chosen any other stock with sufficient number of options.
62Recall that long positions in call options and short positions in put options are bullish, long positions
in put options and short positions in call options are bearish.
63Gregory Zuckerman and Ianthe Dugan. 2007. Moving the Market: Funds Accelerate Subprime
Exit Strategy; Two Firms Move To Stem Bleeding; ’Unraveling’ Market. Wall Street Journal, July 5,
Eastern Edition. http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed October 1, 2009).
64A theory of the investor’s optimal margin account based on a model of optimal borrowing for the
entire margin account can be found in [Luckett, 1982].
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